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Abstract
A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten's (1983) [15]
notion of limit ESS. We demonstrate that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that
it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These
problems arise due to an implicit assumption that mutants are arbitrarily rare relative to trembling
incumbents. Finally, we present a novel deﬁnition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.
KEYWORDS: Limit ESS, evolutionary stability, extensive-form games. JEL Classiﬁcation: C73.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Maynard-Smith & Price [12] deﬁned an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
as a Nash equilibrium that is a strictly better reply against other best-reply strategies. It was
extended in [11] to the weaker notion of a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) that is a weakly
better reply against other best-reply strategies. The motivation for these notions is that a
stable strategy, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be invaded by any alternative
strategy that is initially rare. This is formalized in [4, 16], in which it is shown that any NSS is
Lyapunov stable in the replicator dynamics: no small change in the population composition can
take it away from the state in which everyone follows the NSS, and any ESS is asymptotically
stable: any suﬃciently small change results in a movement back toward the ESS.
Extensive-form games rarely admit an ESS due to the existence of equivalent strategies
that diﬀer only oﬀ the equilibrium path. Selten [15] relaxes this notion by requiring evolutionary
stability in a converging sequence of perturbed games in which the players may infrequently
tremble and play diﬀerent actions by mistake (see Section 2 for the formal deﬁnitions). Selten's
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2 2 Deﬁnitions
solution concept, called limit ESS, is a central notion in the evolutionary study of games with
more than one stage, and it has been applied to various interactions in the economics and
biology literature (see, e.g., [3, 6, 8, 10]).1
At ﬁrst glance, it seems that the notion of limit ESS reﬁnes neutral stability. A few papers in
the literature have expressed this view,2 and, to the best of our knowledge, no counterexample
has been presented. In Section 3, we present a simple game that admits a limit ESS that: (1)
is not neutrally stable, and (2) is dynamically unstable in a strong sense: almost any nearby
initial state takes the population away from the limit ESS. In Section 4, we show that the reason
for this is the implicit assumption in the notion of limit ESS that mutants are arbitrarily rare
relative to the trembling incumbents. Finally, we present a novel deﬁnition, which we call
a uniform limit ESS, that only assumes that the mutants are suﬃciently rare relative to the
non-trembling incumbents. We show that this new notion reﬁnes limit ESS, implies neutral
stability, and has appealing properties.
2 Deﬁnitions
Let Γ be a symmetric two-player extensive-form game (a formal detailed deﬁnition is given in
the appendix). Let index i ∈ {1, 2} denote one of the players, and let −i denote the other
player. Let Ui be the set of information sets of player i. For each such information set u ∈ Ui,
let Cu be the set of choices (or actions) in information set u. The game is endowed with a
symmetry function T that maps each choice c of player i to the symmetric choice cT of player
−i. Let Bi denote the set of behavior strategies of player i (a mapping that assigns a probability
distribution over the set of choices at each information set of player i). Let Ri (b1, b2) be the
expected payoﬀ to player i when each player i plays strategy bi ∈ Bi. Given strategy b ∈ B1,
let bT denote the symmetric strategy of player 2. The symmetry between the strategies implies
that R1
(
b, bT
)
= R2
(
b, bT
)
.
An evolutionarily (neutrally) stable strategy (abbreviated ESS, NSS) is a strategy that
satisﬁes two conditions: (1) it is a best reply to itself (i.e., a symmetric Nash equilibrium), and
(2) it achieves a strictly (weakly) better payoﬀ against any other best-reply strategy. Formally:3
Deﬁnition 1. [11, 12] Strategy b ∈ B1 is an ESS (NSS) if for every b˜ ∈ B1 (b˜ 6= b):
1. R1
(
b, bT
) ≥ R1 (b˜, bT); and
1 The notion is also central in the study of asymmetric one-shot games that are played by a population in
which each agent is randomly assigned one of the roles in the game (see, e.g., [7, 13]).
2 See, e.g., Bhaskar [1, page 274] and Bhaskar [2, page 115], where it is written that it is well known that a
limit ESS is an NSS.
3 Part of the literature calls it direct-ESS, and uses the name ESS only for for mixed strategies.
32. if R1
(
b, bT
)
= R1
(
b˜, bT
)
, then R1
(
b, b˜T
)
> R1
(
b˜, b˜T
)
(R1
(
b, b˜T
)
≥ R1
(
b˜, b˜T
)
).
Bomze & Weibull [4] showed that any NSS is Lyapunov stable in the replicator dynamics:
populations starting close enough to the NSS remain close forever (though a sequence of small
perturbations may take the population away).Taylor & Jonker [16] showed that ESS satisﬁes the
stronger notion of asymptotic stability : populations starting close enough to the ESS eventually
converge to it (see extensions to other payoﬀ-monotonic dynamics in [5, 14]).
Extensive-form games rarely admit an ESS due to the existence of equivalent strategies
that diﬀer only oﬀ the equilibrium path. Selten [15] relaxes this notion by requiring evolu-
tionary stability only in a converging sequence of perturbed games (but not necessarily in the
unperturbed game). Formally:
Deﬁnition 2. [15] A perturbance of a symmetric two-player extensive-form game Γ is a map-
ping η from the set of choices into the reals such that: (1) for each choice c the following hold:
η (c) ≥ 0 and ηc = ηcT ; and (2) for each information set u:
∑
c∈Cu η (c) < 1.
The perturbed game (Γ, η) has the same structure as Γ except that strategy b is admissible
only if bu (c) ≥ ηc for all u and c. Let Bi (η) denote the set of all such admissible strategies
of player i. A limit ESS is the limit point of the ESS of a converging sequence of perturbed
games. Note that the special case of η ≡ 0 is not excluded; hence, every ESS is a limit ESS.
Deﬁnition 3. [15] Strategy b ∈ B1 is a limit ESS if there exists a sequence
(
ηk, bk
)
k∈N such
that bk ∈ B1
(
ηk
)
is an ESS of the game
(
Γ, ηk
)
with ηk → 0 and bk → b when k →∞.
3 Example: Limit ESS That is not Neutrally Stable
In this section we present a limit ESS that (1) is not neutrally stable, and (2) is dynamically
unstable in a strong sense.
Consider the following one-shot symmetric two-player game in which each player has to
simultaneously choose either c1, c2, c3, and the payoﬀ matrix is given by Table 1. With a slight
abuse of notation, let ci denote the strategy that assigns probability one to choice ci. Observe,
ﬁrst, that strategy c1 is a limit ESS. Let the sequence
(
ηk, bk
)
be deﬁned as follows for each
k ≥ 4: ηk (c1) = ηk (c2) = ηk (c3) = 1k , and bk (c1) = 1− 2k , bk (c2) = bk (c3) = 1k . Observe that
each bk is an ESS of the perturbed game
(
Γ, ηk
)
with ηk → 0 and bk → c1 when k →∞.
Next, observe that strategy c1 is not an NSS, becauseR1 (c2, c1) = R1 (c1, c1) andR1 (c2, c2) >
R1 (c1, c2). Moreover, strategy c2 is dynamically unstable in the replicator dynamics: any initial
state that assigns a positive mass to c2 takes the population in the long run to assign mass one
to c2. The reason for this is that strategy c3 is strictly dominated and its frequency converges
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Tab. 1: Payoﬀ Matrix of a Symmetric Two-Player Game
c1 c2 c3
c1 2
2
1
2
4
0
c2 2
1
3
3
1
0
c3 0
4
0
1
0
0
to zero; as soon as the frequency of c3 is suﬃciently small, strategy c2 achieves a strictly higher
payoﬀ than all other strategies in all the remaining stages.
4 Uniform Limit ESS
In this section we reformulate the deﬁnition of limit ESS to highlight what leads to the counter-
intuitive implication demonstrated in the example, and we present a reﬁnement that deals with
this issue.
It is well known (see, e.g., [18, Prop. 2.1 and 2.5]) that a strategy is an ESS iﬀ it outperforms
any other strategy in a mixed population, provided that the share of the other strategy is
suﬃciently small. Formally:
Fact 1. Strategy b ∈ B1 is an ESS in a symmetric two-player game Γ iﬀ there exists some
¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every strategy b˜ ∈ B1 (b˜ 6= b) and every  ∈ (0, ¯):
r1
(
b,  · b˜T + (1− ) · bT
)
> r1
(
b˜,  · b˜T + (1− ) · bT
)
,
where  · b˜T + (1− ) · bT ∈ B2 is the strategy that follows bT with probability 1−  and follows
b˜T with the remaining probability . The strategy is an NSS if the weak inequality holds.
This allows us to reformulate the deﬁnition of a limit ESS as follows:
Fact 2. Strategy b ∈ B1 is a limit ESS if there exists a sequence
(
ηk, bk
)
k∈N with η
k → 0 and
bk → b when k →∞, such that for each k: (1) bk ∈ B1 (η), and (2) there exists ¯k ∈ (0, 1) such
that for every b˜k ∈ B1 (η) (b˜k 6= bk) and every  ∈ (0, ¯k):
r1
(
bk,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
> r1
(
b˜k,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
.
5The order of quantiﬁers in the above deﬁnition implies that the share of the mutants
who follow the diﬀerent strategy can be arbitrarily low relative to the frequency of trembling
incumbents. This is what allows strategy c1 to be a limit ESS in the above example (as the
mutants' loss against trembling incumbents outweighs their gain against other mutants).
We now present an alternative notion (which we call uniform limit ESS) that uses a uniform
bound to the frequency of the mutants to capture the idea that mutants are rare relative to
the incumbents, but not relative to the trembling incumbents. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4. Strategy b ∈ B1 is a uniform limit ESS if there exists a sequence
(
ηk, bk
)
k∈N
with ηk → 0 and bk → b when k →∞, and some ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for each k: (1) bk ∈ B1 (η),
and (2) for every b˜k ∈ B1 (η) (b˜k 6= bk) and every  ∈ (0, ¯):
r1
(
bk,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
> r1
(
b˜k,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
.
It is immediate that any uniform limit ESS is a limit ESS. The following proposition shows
that any uniform limit ESS is an NSS.
Proposition 1. Any uniform limit ESS is an NSS.
Proof. Let b ∈ B1 (η) be a uniform limit ESS. Let b˜ ∈ B1 (η) be any other strategy b˜ 6= b.
Deﬁnition 4 implies that there exist ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and a sequence
(
ηk, bk, b˜k
)
k∈N
with ηk → 0,
bk → b and b˜k → b˜ when k →∞, such that for each k and every  ∈ (0, ¯):
r1
(
bk,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
> r1
(
b˜k,  · b˜Tk + (1− ) · bTk
)
.
By continuity, the analogous weak inequality holds when b replaces bk and b˜ replaces b˜k.
5 Concluding Remarks
1. The applications of the notion of limit ESS (e.g., [3, 6, 7, 8, 10]) also satisfy the reﬁne-
ment of a uniform limit ESS. In this sense, the reﬁnement is not too strong: it omits
implausible limit ESSs like the one presented in Section 3, but it includes interesting and
plausible limit ESSs in applications.
2. In [6] we presented another reﬁnement of limit ESS, which we called strict limit ESS, that
requires the strategy to be the limit of ESS for every converging sequence of ubiquitous
perturbed games (which assign a minimal positive probability for each choice at each
information set). One can show that these two reﬁnements are independent.
6 A A Formal Detailed Deﬁnition of a Two-Player Symmetric Game
3. Prop. 1 implies that any uniform limit ESS is Lyapunov stable. We conjecture that a
uniform limit ESS, which is also a strict limit ESS, satisﬁes a stronger notion of dynamic
stability (but weaker than asymptotic stability): the share of the population who follows
the uniform limit ESS strictly increases from almost any close enough initial state.
A A Formal Detailed Deﬁnition of a Two-Player Symmetric Game
The deﬁnition is based on [15] and [17, Chapters 6 and 9], and we refer the reader to these
references for interpretation and further details.
A symmetric two-player extensive-form game is a tuple Γ = (K,P, U,C, p, r, T ) where:
• The game tree K is a ﬁnite tree with a distinguished node φ - the root of K. Given a node
in the tree x, let S (x) denote its (immediate) successor. Let Z be the endpoints of the
tree (nodes with no successors), and let X be the set of nodes with successors (decision
points). The unique sequence of nodes and branches connecting the root φ with a node x
is called the path to x. We say that x comes before y if x is on the path to y and x 6= y.
• The player partition P is a partition of X into 3 sets: P0, P1, P2. The set Pi is the set
of decision points of player i. Player 0 is the chance player responsible for the random
moves occurring in the game.
• The information partition U is a pair (U1, U2), where Ui is a partition of Pi (the so-called
information sets of player i) such that: (1) every path intersects each information set at
most once, and (2) all nodes in each information set have the same number of successors.
• The choice partition C is a collection C = {Cu|u ∈ U1 ∪ U2}, where Cu is a partition of
∪x∈US (x) into so-called choices (or actions) at u, such that every choice contains exactly
one element of S (x) for every x ∈ U .
• The probability assignment p speciﬁes for every x ∈ P0 a completely mixed probability
distribution px on S (x).
• The payoﬀ function r is a pair (r1, r2), where ri : Z → R assigns a payoﬀ to player i at
each terminal node.
• The symmetry function T is a mapping (·)T from choices to choices with the following
properties: (1) if c ∈ C0, then cT ∈ C0 and p (c) = p
(
cT
)
; (2) if c ∈ Ci, then cT ∈ C−i; (3)(
cT
)T
= c for all c; (4) for every information set u there exists an information set uT such
that every choice at u is mapped onto a choice at uT ; (5) for every endpoint z there exists
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an endpoint zT such that if z is reached by the sequence c1, c2, ..., ck, then z
T is reached
by a permutation of cT1 , c
T
2 , ..., c
T
k ; and (6) ri (z) = r−i
(
zT
)
for every endpoint z.
As is standard in the literature, we restrict the analysis to games with perfect recall (Kuhn
[9]). Formally, for each player i, information sets u, v ∈ Ui, choice c ∈ Cu, and nodes x, y ∈ v,
we assume that c comes before x iﬀ c comes before y. A behavior strategy of player i is a
mapping that assigns a probability distribution over the set of choices Cu to every information
set u ∈ Ui. Let Bi be the set of all behavior strategies of player i, and let B = B1 ×B2 be the
set of all strategy proﬁles. Given strategy proﬁle b = (b1, b2) ∈ B, let Pb (z) be the probability
that endpoint z is reached when b is played, and let Ri (b) be the expected payoﬀ to player i
when the players play strategy proﬁle b: Ri (b) =
∑
z∈Z Pb (z) · ri (z). If b ∈ B1 is a behavior
strategy of player 1 in Γ, then the symmetric image of b is the behavior strategy bTof player 2
deﬁned by: βTu (c) := βuT
(
cT
)
for each u ∈ U2 and c ∈ Cu. Observe that the properties of the
symmetry function imply that R1
(
b, bT
)
= R2
(
b, bT
)
.
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